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Abstract:    
The combinative applications of one-way coupled map lattice (OCML) and some simple 
algebraic operations have demonstrated to be able to construct the best known chaotic 
cryptosystem with high practical security, fast encryption speed, and excellent robustness against 
channel noise. In this paper, we propose a differential-like chosen cipher attack to break the 
prototypical system cooperating with INT and MOD operations. This cryptographic method 
exploits the weakness that the high-dimensional cryptosystem degenerates to be one-dimensional 
under constant driving, therefore, is no more sensitive to the slight perturbation on the driving 
after convergence. The experimental results show that this method can successfully extract the key 
within just hundreds of iterations. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time to present 
successful cryptanalysis on such a cryptosystem. we also make some suggestions to improve the 
security in future versions.     
1. Introduction  
Since the pioneering work of Pecora and Carroll, chaos synchronization based cryptography 
has become a very active research area [1]. However, investigations have shown that a great 
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number of low-dimensional chaotic cryptosystems are fundamentally flawed by a lack of security 
and various attacks such as nonlinear forecasting, return map, adaptive parameter estimation, error 
function attack (EFA), and inverse computation based chosen cipher attack, may succeed in 
recovering messages from the chaotic ciphers [2-6]. Therefore, recent studies have focused on 
high-dimensional chaotic systems, which have more complex dynamics, higher sensitivity to 
parameter mismatches and better random properties [7-12]. Particularly, OCML system 
incorporating with basic algebraic operations such as INT and MOD is found to be able to 
construct cryptosystems with high practical security [9-12]. S-box algebraic operation and 
bit-reverse operation are then introduced into such a cryptosystem and reaches higher security 
with low additional computation expense [10-12]. Furthermore, a two-dimensional map lattice is 
used for obtaining better efficiency [12]. It has been stated that this class of cryptosystem has 
optimal overall cryptographic properties, even much better than advanced encryption standard 
(AES) in security, performance efficiency, and robustness against channel noise, and has been 
applied to practical voice communication [12-13]. 
Meanwhile, various existing cryptanalysis methods have been implemented to evaluate the 
security of this class of cryptosystems [2-6]. However, the statistical property based attacks are not 
effective because of the excellent random statistics of the generated key stream [12]. The 
parameter estimation based attacks do not work because there are no observable state variables 
available for constructing convergent cost functions [4,12]. Moreover, one of the most successful 
attacks, EFA cannot break the system because of two facts [5,12]. Firstly, the error function 
possesses numerous minima, which leads to an erroneous convergence at one of the local minima. 
Secondly, the needle-like basin structure precludes effective finding of the tendency towards the 
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secret key by exhaustive searching. Recently, Hu et al. proposed a quite effective chosen cipher 
attack by using a constant as driving to the receiver [6]. It has been stated that this attack can 
extract the secret key in prototypical scheme proposed in [9] with relatively much less cost (about 
802 iterations for four keys) than that of EFA (about 3610 iterations for four keys) [10]. However, 
the computational cost is still quite large and no detailed analyses can be found. In this paper, we 
introduce the differential mechanism into the constant-driving chosen cipher attack, and present a 
differential-like chosen cipher attack. Under constant driving, the prototypical scheme proposed in 
[9] degenerates to be one-dimensional, thus after convergence, it will not be sensitive to the slight 
perturbation on driving in specially selected intervals. It can be shown that the key stream 
difference before and after the perturbation is a smooth and simple-structured function with 
respect to the secret key on the whole key space. Therefore, intruder can perturb the driving 
slightly and observe the key stream difference, and then use a simple optimal searching algorithm 
to find the key with desired precision only with hundreds of iterations.  
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the spatiotemporal chaos-based 
cryptosystem incorporating OCML with INT and MOD operations in brief. Differential-like 
chosen cipher attack together with the experimental results is presented in section 3. Section 4 
concludes the paper and some suggestions for further improving the security are outlined.  
2. OCML based spatiotemporally chaotic cryptosystem 
The cryptosystem proposed in [9] uses OCML as the core operation, with the additional INT 
and MOD operations for keeping robustness of communication against channel noise, and greatly 
enhancing the sensitivity of chaos synchronization to parameter mismatch, respectively.  
Decryption transformation: 
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1( ) (1 ) [ ( )] [ ( 1)]n j n j ny j f y j f y jε ε+ = − + − , ( ) (3.75 / 4) (1 )j jf x b x x= + − , 1,2,...,j m=      (1a) 
1( ) (1 ) [ ( )] [ ( 1)]n n ny j f y j f y jε ε+ = − + − , ( ) 4 (1 )f x x x= − , 1,...,j m N= +               (1b) 
' int( ( ) 2 )mod 2n nK y N
µ υ= × , ' '( )mod 2n n nI S K υ= −                                  (1c) 
(0) / 2n ny S
υ=                                                              (1d) 
where 'nK , 
'
nI ,  and nS  denote the key stream, the recovered plaintext, and the cipher, 
respectively. The control parameters 1 2( , )mb b b=b " serving as the secret keys can be wildly 
chosen in the interval (0,1) . The other parameters such as coupling strength, system size etc., 
which can be opened to intruder, are typically set as 0.99ε = , 52µ = , 32υ = , 4m = , 25N = . 
The dynamic forms of the transmitter are exactly the same as those of the receiver with ( )ny j , 
'
nK ,
'
nI , and 1 2( , )mb b b=b "  replaced by ( )nx j , nK , nI , and  1 2( , )ma a a=a " , respectively. 
As the receiver is driven by the transmitted signal as (0) (0) / 2vn n ny x S= = , when =b a , the 
receiver can reach chaos synchronization with the transmitter, and successfully recover the true 
plaintext as ( ) ( )n ny N x N= , n nK K′ = , n nI I′ = . 
With the requirement of public-structure and chosen-ciphertext, EFA can be used for 
investigating the system’s key sensitivity [5].  
1
1
1( )
2
T
n nv
n
e b I I
T =
′= −∑                                                        (2) 
where nI ′  can be computed by intruder from a fake receiver with designed ciphertext nS  and 
test key 1b . Basin structure of 1( )e b vs 1b  is shown in Fig.1. [10] has found that the basin width 
can be empirically calculated as 0.3W T∝ , where T  is the total number of observed plaintext 
pairs for each test. As away from the basin, 1( )e b is flat with certain fluctuations, the minimal 
computational cost for finding four secret keys can be roughly calculated as 361 10W ≈  iterations. 
It should be noted that, in the OCML system without INT and MOD operations, large 
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coupling size can also ensure satisfactory confusion and diffusion, but it also prolongs the 
synchronization time and intensifies the error propagation effect. But with the INT and MOD 
operation, it is easy to obtain equivalent confusion and diffusion by coupling much less number of 
lattices, and more important, the resistance against various attacks can be greatly enhanced. In fact, 
several attacks such as parameter estimation attack, inverse computation based chosen cipher 
attack can be used to break OCML system without INT and MOD operations, but these methods 
will fail when with such algebraic operations [4,6,12]. The most important reason is that the state 
of the last lattice is masked and 2µ υ−  computations are needed to derive it from the available key 
stream nK . For parameter estimation, it is impossible to construct a convergent cost function. 
While for inverse computation, 2µ υ−  computations significantly increase the number of equations 
for deriving the secret key, and large coupling size further enhances such difficulties. It will be 
shown later that even with currently strongest chosen cipher attack proposed by Hu et al., the 
minimal computation cost will reach the level of 802 for four parameters [6].   
3.  Differential-like chosen cipher attack   
It is well known that chosen cipher attacks are among the strongest attacks if we classify the 
intensity of various evaluations. The intruder can obtain temporary access to the decryption 
machinery, which enables him to choose a cipher string and construct the corresponding plaintext. 
Recently, Hu et al. suggested an effective chosen cipher attack method to evaluate various chaos 
synchronization based systems by using a constant as the driving [6]. Under such constant driving, 
the response system will asymptotically converge to certain fixed point related to the driving, thus, 
the secret key can be recovered by using inverse computations [6]. In fact, the convergent property 
also holds for the OCML system with INT and MOD algebraic operations. When driven by a 
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constant, for the first lattice,  
1 1 1 1 1(1) (1) (1 ) [ (1)] [ (1)] 4(1 ) (1) (1)n n n n n ny y f y f y y yε ε+ − −− = − − < − −                    (3) 
As 0 4(1 ) 1ε< −  , we have 1lim (1) (1) 0n nn y y+→∞ − = . Repeating the similar computations, we 
can successively prove: 1lim ( ) ( ) 0 2,3...n nn y i y i i N+→∞ − = = . Hence all sites will converge to certain 
fix points when the driving signal is a constant, irrespective how large the coupling size is. 
 However such inverse computation based attack is not computationally feasible to break the 
system with INT and MOD operations, mainly because of the 2µ υ−  multi-solutions from the 
available key stream nK  to ( )ny N , making the number of equations to derive the secret key 
extremely large. Moreover, large coupling size further increases the complexity of resolving such 
equations. Since the computational cost added by the coupling size is neglectable compared with 
that induced by MOD operation, the total cost can be roughly estimated as ( ) 802 2m µ υ− = , obviously 
very large but still much less than that of EFA 3610 . 
 The inverse computation based chosen cipher attack does not fully make use of the properties 
under constant driving. In fact, it can be proved that the previous high-dimensional system will 
become one-dimensional after convergence, hence no more extremely sensitive to small 
perturbation on the driving. In the following section, for simplicity while without loosing 
generality, we take the most sensitive parameter 1b  in the first right term of the first state 
equation as the secret key to explain the differential-like chosen cipher attack. The other nonlinear 
parameters including 1b  in the second term of the first state equation are all set to be public 
constant 1. Because the cipher can be arbitrarily chosen, we take 4 (0)(1 (0))d n ny y y= −  as the 
equivalent driving of the system. As after convergence all the state variables are constant, from Eq. 
(1) we can directly derive the converged state of all sites as: 
 7
' '2 '
1 '
4 ( 1)
( )
2( 1)
d
d
R R R y
y y
R
ε ϕ+ + += =+ , 
'
1(3.75 / 4)(1 ) 1R b ε= + − −                     (4a) 
2
1 1
1
16 ( 1) (1 )
( )
2( 1)
j j
j j
R R R y y
y y
R
ε φ− − −
+ + + −= =+ , 4(1 ) 1R ε= − −                       (4b) 
Consequently, 2 1( ) [ ( )]dy y yφ φ ϕ= = , 23 [ ( )]dy yφ ϕ= , … , 1[ ( )]NN dy yφ ϕ−=              (5) 
 It is clear to find that the previous high-dimensional system becomes one-dimensional, no 
matter how complex the function 1[ ( )]N xφ ϕ−  may be. From Fig. 2, we also see that there exist 
some narrow intervals around 0.495, in which the function 1[ ( )]N xφ ϕ−  is slowly changing. It is an 
indication that when the driving is chosen in these intervals, the system is easier to handle.  
On the other hand, although according to Eq. (1c) there are 202 2µ υ− =  possible solutions 
from NK  to ( )ny N , the difference between two variables, say ( )ny N  and 
' ( )ny N can be 
uniquely determined by their corresponding key stream 'nK  and 
''
nK , provided that 
' 20( ) ( ) 2n ny N y N
−− < , as Eq. (6) shown. The observable difference will be shown later of great 
significance in finding the secret key.    
' '' '( ) ( ) ( ) / 2n ny N y N K K
µ− = −                                                 (6) 
When a constant dy  is used as the driving to make the receiver converge, we take 
1 int( 2 )mod 2NK y
µ υ= ×  as the converged key stream. After convergence, a slight perturbation is 
added to dy  at time t, i.e., 
'
d dy y τ= + , 1τ  . At time t N+  a changed key stream 
'
2 int( 2 )mod 2NK y
µ υ= ×  can be observed. The function 2 1( , )dg b y K K= −  is defined as Instant 
Perturbation Function (IPF), which describes the dependence between the parameter and the key 
stream difference before and after the perturbation. The perturbation 362τ −=  if not specified, 
which ensures that under certain constant driving dy , 
20( , ) 2dg b y
−< holds for any (0,1)b∈ .  
 Furthermore, we can prove that, for every secret key 1 (0,1)b ∈ , there exists at least one 
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driving 1dy  such that 1 1( , ) 0dg b y = , i.e., no difference can be observed before and after the 
perturbation. We call the zone consisting of such points 1 1( , )db y  the silent position. The state 
equations after the perturbation are shown in Eq. (7). Note that all the first terms remain 
unchanged because the perturbation takes effect to them from the next time.   
'
1 1 1 1 1(1 )(3.75 / 4) (1 ) ( )dy b y y yε ε τ= − + − + +                                     (7a) 
1 1
' ' '4(1 ) (1 ) 4 (1 )
j jj j j
y y y y yε ε − −= − − + − , 2,3,...,j N=                              (7b) 
For 'k k ke y y= − , from Eq. (1) and (7) we have the difference dynamics: 
1e ετ= , 21 1 14 (1 2 ) 4 ( )j j j je e y eε ε− − −= − − , 2,3,...,j N=                              (8)   
As 1τ  , 21( ) 0je − =  in practical computation. Thus, Eq. (8) becomes  
1 14 (1 2 )j j je e yε − −= − , 2,3,...,j N=                                              (9) 
Consequently, we have:  
11
1
(4 ) (1 2 )jjj iie yετ ε
−−
== −∏ , 2,3,...,j N=                                        (10) 
Hence, any 0.5jy = , 1,2,..., 1j N= −  leads to 1 1( , ) 0dg b y = . Assuming 1 0.5y = , from Eq. 
(1) we have: 1 1[2 (1 )(3.75 / 4)]/ 4dy bε ε= − − + . When 1b  is freely chosen in (0,1) , the range of 
1dy  can be calculated as (0.49494949495,0.49558080808)Φ = , which is around 0.495 (that’s why 
we choose the interval around 0.495 in Fig. 2). Therefore, for any 1 (0,1)b ∈  we can find at least 
one 1dy  in Φ , satisfying 1 1( , ) 0dg b y = . In Fig. 3 we plot the three-dimensional figure of 
( , ) / 2dg b y
µ  in terms of the secret key chosen in (0,1)  and the driving in Φ . The bottom of the 
mesh represents the silent position. It can be clearly seen that there is at least one 1dy  for every 
secret key corresponding to the silent state, which experimentally proves our above conclusion.  
Since 1[ ( )]N xφ ϕ−  is slowly changing in Φ , as Fig. 2 shown, a simple optimal searching 
algorithm shown in Eq. (11) can be used to search one appropriate 1dy  in Φ .       
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 1 1 2 1( 1) ( ) ( ) / 2d dy k y k K K
υγ+ = + −                                             (11)   
 Moreover, if there is one point 1 1( , )db y satisfying 1 1( , ) 0dg b y = , then there exists one line 
Y AX B= + containing the point 1 1( , )db y , on which any point, say * *( , )b y , satisfies * *( , ) 0g b y = . 
If 1b  and 1dy  are used as the secret key and the constant driving, respectively, the converged 
state of the first lattice is 1 1 1( , )dy b yϕ= , shown in Eq. (4a). From Eq. (5) and (10), we know that 
1 1( , )dg b y is uniquely determined by 1y . Hence, any point 
* *( , )b y  making * *1 1 1,| ( , )d db b y yy b yϕ= = =  
leads to * * 1 1( , ) ( , ) 0dg b y g b y= = . Then from Eq. (4a), we can obtain the line equation: 
1 1 1 1
* *
1( , ) ( , )/ (1 )(1 )(3.75 ) /d db y b yy y bϕ ϕε ε ε= + − − +                                (12) 
Therefore, there is a linear dependence between the secret key and the driving corresponding 
to the silent state. As a result, the task of finding the secret key can be converted to find the 
corresponding driving. We can use the iterative method described in Eq. (11) with the middle point 
of Φ  as the initial value to search the corresponding driving in Φ  for every test key in (0,1) . 
As Fig. 4 shown, all the possible points * *( , )b y  belong to five lines. We can experimentally 
calculate the equations of line 1-5, results averaging over 100 realizations shown in Table 1.   
Therefore, the procedure of finding the secret key by using differential-like chosen cipher 
attack can be as follows (taking a randomly generated number 1 0.7865302612b =  for example).  
Step 1: Search a constant driving for the authorized receiver using Eq. (11). The step size 
0.0001γ = . After about 100 iterations we can obtain 1 0.495206963987366133dy = . 
Step 2: Analytically calculate the possible secret keys by inserting 1dy  to the line equations. 
Five corresponding solutions can be obtained, -0.2283274311, 0.3978096430, 0.5934578440, 
0.7865302612, and 1.412698303. Obviously one of the points in {0.3978096430, 0.5934578440, 
0.7865302612} is the secret key because only these three points are in (0,1) . Hence, if we 
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construct three fake receivers using these three keys, we can make sure that one of them will 
correctly recover the plaintext, shown in Fig. 5.  
4. Conclusion   
The OCML based cryptosystem incorporating with algebraic operations has excellent overall 
cryptographic properties. This class of cryptosystem has been shown to be resistible against all the 
existing attack strategies. In this paper, we present a differential-like chosen cipher attack to break 
the prototypical scheme of this class of system cooperating OCML with INT and MOD operations. 
The most important factor leading to the success is that the high-dimensional system degenerates 
into one-dimensional when driven by a constant, thus no more sensitive to slight perturbations on 
the driving. The numerical experiments results also have demonstrated the capability.  
Moreover, the overall security of this class of cryptosystem can be highly improved by using 
deterministic randomness and its realizable asymptotic model called Lissajious map [14-15]. 
Actually, similar concept has also been used to enhance chaoticity of spatiotemporal chaos by Li 
et al. recently [16]. Another spatiotemporal chaos based cryptosystem built on Lissajious map has 
already been designed. Our current results show that for the modified cryptosystem, the parameter 
sensitivity can reach the computational precision 522− , when the coupling size N is only three, and 
parallel encryption is feasible even in one-dimensional structure. More important, the improved 
cryptosystem can effectively resist the differential-like chosen cipher attack because the 
perturbation function becomes quite complex. The detailed analyses will be given in our 
forthcoming paper. 
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Captions of Figures 
FIG. 1. 1000T = . (a) Basin structure of error function, where point 0x  in x-axis represents 
that 0551 1 2
xb a − +− =  for 0 0x ≠ ,while 1 1b a=  for 0 0x = . (b) Fluctuation of error function. 
FIG. 2. Converged state with respect to the driving around 0.495. (a) 10N =  (b) 20N =  (c) 
24N =  (d) 25N = . 
FIG. 3. ( , ) / 2dg b y
µ  with respect to the secret key (0,1)b∈  and the driving dy ∈Φ . 
FIG.4. (a) 0.7865302612b = . The procedure of searching dy  using the adaptive method 
shown in Eq. (11). (b) Driving dy  as a function of the test key b  satisfying ( , ) 0dg b y = . From 
the left bottom to the right top, the line index is, respectively, 1 to 5. 
FIG. 5. Plaintext recovery. The first 1000 data have been discarded. (a) The plaintext (b) The 
cipher (c) The recovered plaintext by using 1 0.3978096430b = (d) The recovered plaintext by 
using 1 0.5934578440b = (e) The recovered plaintext by using 1 0.7865302612b = . 
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Captions of Tables 
TABLE 1: The equation of the lines which contain all possible * *( , )b y . 
 
Table 1 
Line Index A B 
1 -0.000631312462327782 0.495062818034644914 
2 -0.000631313093178722 0.495458106423557865 
3 -0.000622651840623326 0.495576481606239128 
4 -0.000631313094171622 0.495703510840223460 
5 -0.000631312458570371 0.496098818026457278 
 
